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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

**Joint/Interagency/Interconnected: Maritime Security and Defense in the Global
War on Terror**

By

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**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
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Abstract

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In order for the U.S. to be successful in the maritime global war on terror, the Coast Guard should assist the Navy in conducting major operations against terrorists and their support in the international littorals. Conversely, the Navy should assist the Coast Guard in conducting major operations in the offshore U.S. environment in defense of the United States. In other words, the Navy and Coast Guard should closely integrate through coordination and cooperation on a proverbial ‘war’ footing, ultimately leveraging their distinct strengths directly and indirectly to the terrorism problem in the other’s assigned areas of responsibility.

The Navy and Coast Guard must be joined on a wartime footing similar to that of World War II, but at a much more sophisticated level suitable for the complex nature of war and the asymmetric nature of the threat in the 21st century. The Navy and Coast Guard team should practice their operational art in a joint, flexible, and interconnected manner in both domestic and international maritime theaters. They must employ military and law enforcement power appropriately in time, space, and force to reach the four goals of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, to *Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend* against terrorism.

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INTRODUCTION

“America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.”ⁱ

George W. Bush- 29 January 2002

In the maritime global war on terror (GWOT) abroad in the short term, the U.S. must be able to increase access to sovereign regions where terrorists operate. The U.S. should also increase the capability of friendly forces to rapidly counter terrorists and their support organizations operating in sovereign international territories. To win the GWOT in the long term, the U.S. must enhance international cooperation and coordination and interconnect with international partners to increase pressure on terrorism around the globe.

This paper focuses on the domestic maritime and the Persian Gulf GWOT campaigns. The Navy is the maritime component commander in the Persian Gulf maritime campaign. The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency in the domestic maritime campaign. Both the Navy and Coast Guard share distinct and complementary core capabilities. These complementary capabilities can be leveraged to help produce a major operations or “a series of related battles, engagements, and other tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and place and aimed to accomplish an operational (and sometimes strategic) objective” in the other service’s area of operations.ⁱⁱ

Specifically, in order for the U.S. to be successful in the maritime global war on terror, the Coast Guard should assist the Navy to initiate major operations against terrorists and their support in the international littorals. Conversely, the Navy should assist the Coast Guard to initiate major operations in the offshore U.S. environment in defense of the United States. In other words, the Navy and Coast Guard should integrate through coordination and

cooperation on a proverbial ‘war’ footing, ultimately leveraging their distinct strengths directly and indirectly to the GWOT in the other’s assigned areas of responsibility.

To illustrate this thesis, I will first discuss U.S. strategic goals in the GWOT both at home and abroad, analyze the general nature of the conflict at hand, and describe the military and related political conditions needed to achieve the strategic goals. Theater specific shortcomings will be analyzed. In the second half of this paper, I will describe the sequence of actions required to reach necessary military and political conditions to achieve strategic goals. Next I will describe how available forces can best be applied within that sequence of actions. Finally, I will discuss the pros and cons of the suggested approach, make a recommendation, and offer a conclusion.

ANALYSIS

First, we must understand U.S. strategic goals, both at home and abroad, in combating terrorism. The strategy articulated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is called the 4D strategy. The goals of the 4D strategy are to: ***Defeat*** [emphasis added] terrorists and their organizations; to ***Deny*** sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; to ***Diminish*** the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and, to ***Defend*** U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.ⁱⁱⁱ In the maritime environment, the first two goals to Defeat and to Deny currently seem to apply more widely abroad, responsibility resting with the Navy. The Navy has participated directly and indirectly with identifying, locating, and destroying terrorists in Iraq and helped to strengthen and sustain the international maritime effort to fight terrorism. Sea control was maintained continuously since U.S. forces entered Iraq last spring. These characteristics clearly describe the elements of the Defeat and Deny 4D strategy goals; they fit most clearly in the wartime environment of the Persian Gulf.

In the maritime environment, the Coast Guard seemed to have been called upon primarily to carry out the last two 4D strategy goals, to Diminish vulnerabilities and to Defend U.S. citizens and interests. For example, the Coast Guard has secured domestic ports and critical infrastructure. It has also reached out internationally to develop legislation through the International Maritime Agency (IMO), to cooperate with foreign security agencies, and commencing July 1, 2004, will begin to enforce International Standards for Port Security (ISPS).^{iv} Additionally, the Coast Guard has aggressively implemented the National Strategy for Homeland Security, enhanced domestic maritime domain awareness, and developed an effective interagency ‘Integrated Command System’ (ICS) for incident management.

To be successful in the maritime GWOT, critical strengths must be both protected and used to attack our adversaries’ center of gravity. U.S. strengths are illustrated below.

“The National Strategy for Homeland Security describes four foundations- unique American strengths that cut across all of the mission areas, across all levels of government, and across all sectors of our society. These foundations- law, science and technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation- provide a useful framework for evaluating our homeland security investments across the federal government.”^v

Let us now look at two possible centers of gravity of our enemy.

Proponents of an indirect strategic approach to fighting Islamist terrorism conclude that the center of gravity of our adversary is the use of extremist Islamic, religious ideology to influence others. In order to be successful in this war, it is this extreme ideology that we must fight. Since the terrorist ideology is best directly attacked using diplomatic, economic, and informational sources of power, the military source of power should be used as a secondary effort, in support of the main effort.^{vi} The military source of power can be used to attack the enemy’s critical vulnerability, their decentralized operations cells. As a result, terrorists will not make headlines and increase credibility with potential sympathizer.

Others may conclude that the center of gravity of our enemy in the GWOT is the autonomous, decentralized, global network of terrorist cells themselves. A direct strategic approach to fighting Islamic terrorism would be derived from this analysis. This direct approach would require a similarly autonomous, globally empowered, counterterrorism network to fight it. This type of counterterrorist force would have to consist of an interconnected, international coalition of military, federal, local and non-governmental entities the likes of which the world has yet to see. Of course, this theory still requires the other sources of national power- diplomatic, informational, law enforcement, economic, etc., to be heavily relied upon as well.

Just as important, the military must not allow our adversary to attack the U.S. center of gravity, public opinion. Public opinion is what holds our coalition and society together in the GWOT fight. Our enemy can attack public opinion in two ways, directly or indirectly through our critical vulnerability, our institutions. Our institutions are our critical vulnerability because they are large, reactionary, and often slow to respond. Policy crafted by institutions under a democracy can be perceived to lack consistency and common sense when applied in an international context. The enemy can attack our center of gravity indirectly by getting ‘under our skin’ thus forcing our institutions and bureaucracy, including the military, to make mistakes. A recent example of this is the Iraq prisoner abuse scandal. A well-intentioned military system allowed itself to be consumed with tactical objectives (obtaining information), thus placing strategic objectives (legitimacy) in jeopardy. The soldiers and chain of command rationalize that the ends justified the means. Unfortunately, this rationalization ultimately compromised our legitimacy and, therefore, our strategic objectives. The lesson here is that, above all, we must first not defeat ourselves. Perhaps this

is the reason why principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) were created; principles of war were being misapplied in the new, complex, post cold-war environment.

In order to attack our enemy's center of gravity in the maritime GWOT most effectively, while protecting our own center of gravity, the principles of MOOTW Restraint, Unity of Effort, and Perseverance will have to be used overseas. The military is accustomed to being the main effort in wars of the past. In the GWOT, the military may be, or soon become, a secondary effort to the larger diplomatic, economic, and informational effort in a struggle that may likely to last a very long time.

This realization may not come easily for our powerful, self-efficacious, tradition-steeped Navy. A culture of independent, extremely high tech operations may make it difficult for the Navy to understand that they may not alone be the maritime lynchpin to the GWOT in the future.^{vii} It may also be difficult for the Navy to understand that its high technology and sea power alone may not be enough to accomplish the job. One specific example of a capability that it does not possess is the authority and the associated competencies to achieve domain awareness and to deny sanctuary in international littorals in GWOT post-hostility situations. The U.S. Navy's awesome strength and power projection can scare off small, sovereign governments, subsequently limiting potential coalition access to certain areas. The Navy's gung-ho culture and winning attitude is admirable, but help may be needed in this new type of war. Cooperation and integration with the Coast Guard can offer unique competencies that can in turn help to achieve political objectives and contribute to the battle for hearts and minds in the maritime GWOT.

The second way the enemy can attack our center of gravity is by a direct attack at the homeland. Direct attacks on the homeland on 9/11 emboldened U.S. resolve for a GWOT.

Further attacks though, may have an opposite result, negatively affecting public opinion for the GWOT due to U.S. intolerance for additional civilian casualties and prolonged economic instability. Certainly, world sympathy for 9/11 has a limited shelf-life and world opinion may turn to blame, rather than to support, strong U.S. military reactions to another domestic attack. The world supported our actions in Afghanistan, but was split in its support of Iraq II.

In order to protect our citizens in the maritime GWOT, good intelligence, information sharing, and more complete layers of domain awareness in the offshore environment must be utilized in the maritime homeland security effort. The culture (or curse) of Semper Paratus, ‘Always Ready’, makes it difficult for the Coast Guard to understand that they cannot protect the entire coast of the U.S alone. The Coast Guard does not have the resources to provide homeland security and maritime domain awareness in the offshore environment with a coastline of 95,000 miles. Although it is establishing a solid last line of defense in our harbors, it still has no persistent offshore detection and warning system. Without early detection and warning, it is entirely plausible that a large ship loaded with explosives or carrying a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and steaming at speed could reach our cities without being stopped. The Coast Guard’s ‘can do’ attitude and record of performance is admirable, but help is needed especially with the consequence fraught by this new kind of war. Cooperation and coordination with the Navy will provide the reach necessary to bolster security and the immediate capability to further improve maritime domain awareness in the U.S. offshore environment.

Once thought unimaginable, the limited objectives of our enemy, to shift global power and to establish a separate Islamic state, seem not nearly so inconceivable. With recent events in Iraq, the unlimited U.S. objective to eradicate terrorism seems further away than

before. It is time for a new way of thinking. A new operational art is needed that is focused on meeting military conditions and political objectives in a new environment. The next part of this paper will suggest a powerful partnership for the maritime environment.

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthral ourselves, and then we shall save our country.^{viii}

The enemy is a flexible and asymmetric threat, the likes of which we have not reckoned with before now. The enemy has the ability to strike globally and cause U. S. and coalition casualties. The larger the attack and number of casualties, the more credibility is lent to the extremist Islamic terrorist movement. Therefore, we must keep the principle of war ‘Maneuver’ in mind at all times. We have to continually keep the enemy on the run, away from safe havens, resources, and our own shores. Our enemy takes sanctuary in the seams our very system creates or merely seams that have yet to be sealed up. These have been the result of not working together, from the separation of law enforcement efforts and military operations, and from not forming international partnerships of sufficient quantity and quality. In today’s complex global environment, we must place a premium on cooperation and coordination at every level.

Should the enemy reach our waters, we must successfully defend against him with a vigorous, layered defense. As such, we must keep in mind the principle of war ‘Offensive’ and coordinate the most effective homeland security posture possible. By accomplishing this state of readiness, we will keep the enemy from successfully attacking. Without successful U.S. operations, the enemy will not be able to directly attack U.S. public opinion and bolster its visibility and credibility with its sympathizers. We must seize and exploit the initiative and maintain an offensive spirit in the defense of our homeland. We must vary our approach

and enlist all available help to protect the vast coastline, the numerous ports, and the critical maritime habitat that makes our nation great.

SOLUTIONS IN THE MARITIME GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Having analyzed the GWOT from a maritime perspective, I will now describe the sequence of actions required in order to be successful in the maritime GWOT. The situation in the homeland security theater of operations can be best described as a one where concentration of forces and vigilance matters the most. Domestic forces have been concentrated in U.S. ports and waterways, leaving the offshore environment relatively thin. For example, each time the homeland security alert system is placed into effect, homeland security units are pulled from the offshore environment to further concentrate in the ports. Furthermore, in times of lower homeland security threat conditions, pressure to perform conventional domestic offshore missions such as fisheries and drug law enforcement arise. Although these conventional missions can be performed in conjunction with homeland security missions such as maritime domain awareness, vigilance to the homeland security mission in the offshore sector does suffer naturally. When combined with the magnitude of the overall task, the result is a lack of concentration in the offshore sector. Without specific intelligence, it is in this battle space that a suspect terrorist ship intended for use as a bomb or a WMD scenario will be initially detected and thwarted. Actions must be sequenced to provide a more persistent layered defense in the domestic offshore region.

Sequence of Actions At Home. The first stage of employment of forces in the maritime domain at home will be to backfill homeland security responsibilities in the ports, and then redeploy or surge homeland security assets offshore. This stage can commence immediately and proceed as backfill units, Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), Port Security

Units (PSUs), 170' WPCs, and modified 123' Patrol Boats, are made available. This stage will be called Stage I Homeland or Stage I'H'.

Stage IIH, the second stage of force employment at home, will consist of a redeployment of military defense units from abroad and thus must be sequenced with Stage II Abroad, outlined below. These units will conduct random routine patrols in the course of readiness preparations. To the extent possible with worldwide surge requirements, U.S. defense forces will concentrate during elevated homeland security alerts. Priority redeployment of homeland defense units to this theater will be required as necessary to avoid culmination of the defense of the U.S. homeland. Priority redeployment would be determined through operational intelligence assessments and by the magnitude of possible consequences of specific threats. For example, specific intelligence of a WMD operation would merit priority redeployment of units in support of homeland defense.

The third and final stage of employment of forces at home will be to reconstitute homeland security forces' employment with new homeland security technologies and capabilities over the next five to ten year period. At this time, specific U.S. defense forces will be demobilized. As with every U.S. mariner, U.S. defense forces should continue to play a responsible role in maritime domain awareness and 'community policing' for U.S. homeland security.

Application of Force (Joint):

Navy units and groups should deploy for "maritime domain awareness monitoring and detection" for homeland security in the U.S. offshore environment. This would be very similar to how naval units operate currently when assigned drug law enforcement duty for Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East. These monitoring-and-detection-only missions

will be completed in conjunction with normal military preparedness training and exercises, essentially making the Navy multi-mission. During elevated Homeland Security conditions, Navy units would revert to Homeland Security missions solely and could be augmented with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) as necessary. During times of high military tempo operations abroad that require Navy surge deployments, the Coast Guard would surge operationally and withdraw from normal peacetime multi-missions to fill the security gap in the U.S. offshore. This concept is consistent with contemporary ideas for the Chief of Naval Operations' Fleet Redeployment Concept.

In five to ten years, a reconstituted offshore homeland security capability directed by the Homeland Security Department and supported by congress will recapitalize the U.S. Coast Guard fleet. This will include enhanced maritime domain awareness, operational and integrated, net-centric warfare capabilities. At least until that time, however, the Coast Guard must be able to utilize the Navy's reach, C4ISR capability, and technology to achieve the National Strategy for Terrorism goals. Specifically, it needs to *Diminish* the vulnerabilities that terrorists seek to exploit and *Defend* U.S. citizens and interests at home before a terrorist threat reaches our shores. In order to contribute to the U.S. defense in depth, the sequenced stages of force employment at home must be further sequenced with a stages of action and force employment abroad. The stages of action and force employment abroad will now be discussed.

Sequence of Actions Abroad. There is currently a rising tide of anti-American sentiment in the Middle-East region that could serve to force a culminating point to our operations in the maritime GWOT in the region sooner than might be anticipated. In order to avoid such a culmination and to achieve success in the maritime GWOT abroad, I suggest four stages of

force employment that will be sequenced with stages of action in the U.S. domestic maritime theater.

The first employment stage in the maritime theater abroad will be to establish a definitive Phase IV post-hostilities stage for the Persian Gulf maritime theater. This stage will be called Stage I Abroad or Stage I'A'. This stage will commence on 30 June 2004 to coincide with the transfer of power in Iraq to an Iraqi government. This stage will signal the military's intent to ultimately shift U.S. maritime control of the Persian Gulf to regional control. Interception operations will be conducted more under law enforcement auspices than from a military right of visit approach. This stage will also set the tone for diplomatic talks intended to persuade the inclusion of maritime peacekeeping units from the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) or a coalition of regional partners. Security forces will augment military defense forces.

Stage IIA of forces' employment abroad will consist of a demobilization of some U.S. defense forces in favor of more Combined Joint Interagency Task Forces (CJIATF) led by the U.S. Navy. While it is estimated that a very gradual demobilization of U.S. defense forces could begin after one year, it could take up to three years to develop a substantial combined, joint, interagency maritime coalition. Critical U.S. homeland security units would be added as part of the coalition through force sharing benefits received in Stage IIIH. U.S. led coalition forces would provide maritime security to the Persian Gulf region of instability and later, could be used to export that same security where maritime terrorism at sea and piracy can flourish. In this way, the maritime services could be leaders in filling what Navy analyst Thomas Barnett calls "the gap" between stable and unstable regions in the world.^{ix}

The third stage of forces' employment abroad would be to reconstitute maritime security in the region with regional security or NATO forces operating in critical areas such as straits and littorals. The U.S. Navy would continue to provide leadership and many of the operational functions necessary to support this combined effort including movement and maneuver. This stage could take three to five years to put in place.

Finally, Stage IVA force employment abroad would transition to regional or NATO control of security in the maritime region of the Persian Gulf in five years. Participation and support from U.S. defense and homeland security entities would be provided only as necessary. The sequencing of maritime actions abroad described above would ultimately achieve desired U.S. military conditions in the maritime region and contribute to accomplishment of U.S. strategic goals in the most effective manner.

Application of Force Concept (Interagency). The Coast Guard has interagency experience that it can leverage for the component commander to lessen functional operational burdens as well as to strengthen the fight and broaden access to terrorist sanctuaries. Although its technology is not necessary 'high' technology, the Coast Guard does have proven competencies and processes that can be quite helpful in the theater of operations. Its expertise has been provided to the component commander to ensure that navigational channels are properly marked, oil pollution incidents are expeditiously cleaned up, port security is provided, interdictions are made, and search and rescue operations are properly carried out. Hundreds of Coast Guard forces, requested by the Combatant Commander, are fulfilling primarily force protection and security roles directly in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Performance of these operational functions has been praised.

The Coast Guard also can utilize its experience in the interagency process, bolstered by its military character, to raise the level of understanding and functioning of joint, interagency teams. While it is frustrating for the military to work with the complexities of civilian agencies, the Coast Guard has day-to-day experience leading maritime contingencies for port security operation and consequence management issues such as oil spills and search and rescue operations.

Application of Force Concept (Interconnected). Coast Guard participation in federal law enforcement information systems, regular interagency relationships, and domestic and international interagency leadership roles provide access to information sharing and systems otherwise unavailable to the military. This access can lead to interagency cooperation and memorandums of agreements that can deny sanctuary to potential terrorists and apply additional pressure to terrorist cells abroad.

The Coast Guard also has many mission areas, other than defense operations, in which it helps sovereign countries in their territorial seas. Maritime law enforcement, marine safety, port safety and security, and maritime transportation are requested mission areas where Coast Guard capabilities are shared internationally. The humanitarian character of the service, as well as its small size, makes it inviting to most nations of the world due to their services' similar size and scope. The type of international presence the Coast Guard can provide can strengthen the U.S. fight against terrorism. It can further broaden access to terrorist sanctuaries and collect real-world intelligence terrorist leads that would have otherwise been missed. Malaysia refused U.S. Navy presence in the pirate populated Malacca Straits two months ago; however, two weeks ago it was announced that Coast Guard officers would be placed in Malaysian ports to inspect for International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)

Code before the 1 July 2004 enforcement actions begin. The Coast Guard will assist in implementing these measures in 45 countries each year.^x

To facilitate an interagency and interconnected process in the international region of the Persian Gulf, Coast Guard LEDET and marine safety personnel should deploy to U.S. Navy ships and to international ports in the Persian Gulf as requested to assist with ISPS. During Stage IIA, additional Coast Guard ships, international training team personnel, and Marine Safety and Security personnel should also work with countries of interest as requested. The goal of such actions should be to facilitate coalition access to the territorial sea of various countries and develop international security capabilities long-term. Access to international littorals could be provided can under law enforcement terms in the form of additional host nation ships and personnel, international law enforcement ship rider personnel on U.S. or other coalition vessels. Law enforcement memorandums of agreement to identify and combat terrorists in these regions can also be developed.

PROS AND CONS

Some have argued that Coast Guard and Navy roles should be further separated, with the Coast Guard solely providing homeland security along U.S. shores and the Navy working alone overseas. Specifically in August 2003, it was reported that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that “the Coast Guard is no longer needed in combat theaters” and that he would “prefer that the Coast Guard concentrate on its Homeland Security mission, protecting the U.S. coast-line while the navy and other armed forces take over port security and other missions overseas.”^{xi} The recent death of DC3 Bruckenthal, USCG in a waterborne terrorist attack in the Persian Gulf, brought further popular scrutiny by the media as to the Coast

Guard's role overseas. Similarly, Congress scrutinizes how conventional Coast Guard missions are affected by the GWOT.

The proponents of separating the roles of the military sea services contend that the Coast Guard does not have the resources, and the Navy does have the resources, to provide port security, to conduct interdiction operations, and to wage the maritime GWOT overseas alone. Furthermore, these arguments suggest that the principles of war 'Unity of Command' and 'Simplicity' would benefit from a bifurcated approach to operations in the maritime Global War on Terror. Certainly, intra-service maritime coordination and cooperation would be easier than inter-service coordination and cooperation. Contingency plans could be concretely constructed and communicated more easily to ensure sailors' understanding of the mission.

While they seem appealing, these arguments oversimplify the nature of the war in the 21st century and the current threat. We are in a battle of coalitions and, at stake, are the hearts and minds of the nation and the world. We can not fight this war alone. The enemy is flexible, decentralized and adaptive and is exposing itself to our techniques and tactics. The enemy is continuously learning. This is the time for us to band together and cooperate, coordinate, and innovate to fight a elusive enemy. This is not the time to retrench to old, cold-war, bureaucratic ways of fighting. We must work to bring forth diverse, integrated capabilities, not segregated ones because it is easier.

Critics of integration of effort of the Coast Guard and Navy in this GWOT ignore three important principles of war not yet discussed: Security, Surprise, and Economy of Force. The Coast Guard is the longest continuously operating naval service, providing security and conducting interdiction operations on a daily basis since 1790. The creation of Revenue

Cutter Service, the Coast Guard forerunner, was for protection of commerce and collection of taxes at sea.^{xii} The Coast Guard has also participated in every major war and conflict in our nation's history, providing niche and complementary capabilities in each. Just like the Navy, the Coast Guard is a unique instrument of national security that should not be ignored.

The second principle of war that supports an integrated, interconnected effort is Surprise. Surprise can be achieved by interagency cooperation through the introduction of diverse tactics, unique intelligence information sharing, and access to different aspects of the enemy's operations. Interconnecting internationally will open different fronts on the GWOT, bring additional capabilities to the fight, and strengthen international support. An integrated, interconnected interagency and international effort will help keep the enemy on the run. It will even positively affecting the security of our domestic shores.

Finally, by integrating the Coast Guard and Navy on a wartime footing, the principle of Economy of Force will be utilized. U.S. homeland security can be improved by utilizing the presence of the Navy units redeployed from overseas. Navy units can perform maritime domain awareness and presence missions along the U.S. coast while at home training and preparing for international surge. This plan is consistent with draft Fleet Response Plan doctrine. By leveraging Coast Guard interagency expertise and the ability to cooperate internationally, the U.S. Navy has performance barriers removed and ultimately additional resources available to interconnect with to attack terrorism from multiple fronts

RECOMMENDATIONS

Transformation really is about much more than platforms and technology. It is about how we use what we have. I think in this era it is more than anything about jointness. Indeed beyond jointness...^{xiii}

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, March 2004

The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have unique, complementary, and needed competencies. Recall the foundation strengths for homeland security (critical strengths) cited in the National Strategy for Homeland Security and previously discussed above. The U.S. Coast Guard and Navy each possess unique aspects of these foundations- law, information sharing and systems, technology and science, and international cooperation- that are unlike that of the other. The Coast Guard and Navy team should use the powerful diversity of each other's particular foundation strengths as force multipliers. Their strengths should be used to complement each other in their respective maritime areas of responsibility, through a phased approach in the manner outlined above. Through such an approach, security gaps would be filled, more terrorists would be on the run overseas, and the U.S. citizens and interests would be better protected at home. Handcuffing the Coast Guard at home and shackling the Navy abroad for whatever politically motivated reason merely creates seams in each theater that our adaptive, asymmetric enemy will surely exploit.

CONCLUSION

In summary, you must have the right force, in the right place, at the right time to best meet military conditions necessary to succeed in the maritime GWOT. The Navy and Coast Guard must be joined on a wartime footing similar to World War II, but at a much more sophisticated level suitable for the complex nature of war and the asymmetric nature of the threat in the 21st century. The Navy and Coast Guard team should practice their operational art in a joint, flexible, and interconnected manner in both the domestic and Persian Gulf maritime theaters. Both must employ military and law enforcement power appropriately in time, space, and force to best *Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend* against terrorist enemies.

Notes

ⁱ Bush, George W. quoted in National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism (February 2003). (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003), 15.

ⁱⁱ Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare. (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), 638.

ⁱⁱⁱ The White House, National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003), 15.

^{iv} U.S. Homeland Security Department, Protecting America's Ports: Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Washington, DC: Press Secretary Release. July, 1, 2003.

^v Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, 16 July 2002), x.

^{vi} Serge Bertrand, Fighting Islamist Terrorism – An Indirect Strategic Approach. Newport, RI: Salve Regina University: 2002.

^{vii} Joint Military Operations Department, Lecture Delivered by Chisholm, Donald W. Naval Way of War. Newport, RI: Naval War College: 17 March 04.

^{viii} Abraham Lincoln, quoted in Richard Myers, "A Word From the Chairman," Joint Forces Quarterly, 34 (Spring 2003): 1.

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